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Abstract: This paper examines Robert Kil-
wardby’s (ca. 1215-1279) treatment of causal
necessity and contingency. In his Commen-
tary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and in his
De ortu scientiarum, Kilwardby seems to be
particularly concerned with the precarious
epistemological status of ethics and physics
insofar as these disciplines deal with contin-
gent events. In order to reconcile strictly sci-
entific knowledge with conjectural forms of
knowledge, Kilwardby sets the problem of
contingency in a genuinely gnoseological
rather than metaphysical context, arriving at
a highly original account of contingency. 
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Resumen: El presente artículo examina el
concepto de necesidad causal y de contin-
gencia en Roberto Kilwardby (ca. 1215-1279).
Este autor, en su Comentario a los Segundos
Analíticos de Aristóteles y en el De ortu scien-
tiarum, parece particularmente interesado en
el precario estatuto epistemológico de la
ética y de la física en tanto que estas discipli-
nas versan sobre acontecimientos contin-
gentes. Con el fin de reconciliar el conoci-
miento científico en sentido estricto con
formas conjeturales de conocimiento, Kil-
wardby sitúa el problema de la contingencia
en un contexto auténticamente gnoseoló-
gico, más que metafísico, llegando así a una
explicación altamente original de la contin-
gencia.
Palabras clave: Causalidad, contingencia,
conocimiento, ciencia, Roberto Kilwardby.
Causalidad, contingencia y ciencia en Roberto Kilwardby
RECIBIDO: JUNIO DE 2010 / ACEPTADO: NOVIEMBRE DE 2010
AFIL 44_ana ok R_AFIL  09/03/11  12:32  Página 95
ALEXANDER FIDORA
ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 95-10996
1. INTRODUCTION
lthough Robert Kilwardby (ca. 1215-1279) is generally ac-
knowledged to be among the most significant figures of the
13th Century, he has not received much scholarly attention
during the last decades1. Thus, his most outstanding work, the De
ortu scientiarum, which was published in a critical edition more than
30 years ago, still awaits a thorough doctrinal study2. 
However, it seems that, recently, interest in Kilwardby both as
a theologian and as a philosopher has been on the rise. As far as the-
ology is concerned, we now have at our disposal a critical edition of
the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Sentences Commentary3, while Inos
Biffi has made the first attempt to give a survey of his theological
teachings4. And also with respect to the historiography of philoso-
phy, highly important advances in our understanding of Kilwardby
are being made: In this regard, we should mention first of all the
works by Debora Cannone, who has prepared an edition of Kil-
wardby’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics5, and has also
presented a specimen of his exegetical modus procedendi in that Com-
mentary in an article published recently in Documenti e studi sulla
tradizione filosofica medievale6.
My concern in this article is to make a modest contribution to
the study of Kilwardby, by examining his treatment of the problem
of causal necessity and contingency within his epistemological ac-
1. The only monographical study devoted to Kilwardby of which I know, dates from
1937: E. M. F. SOMMER-SECKENDORFF, Studies in the Life of Robert Kilwardby O.P. (Is-
tituto Storico Domenicano, Roma, 1937).
2. The most comprehensive study of this work still remains that of Sharp, a study pub-
lished long before the critical edition of the text and which is in fact but a summary
of its contents: D. E. SHARP, The ‘De ortu scientiarum’ of Robert Kilwardby (d. 1279),
“The New Scholasticism” 8 (1934) 1-55. 
3. Cfr. the recent edition: E. GÖSSMANN, G. HAVERLINK, G. LEIBOLD, R. SCHENK y
J. SCHNEIDER (eds.), Quaestiones in quattuor libros sententiarum (Bayerische Akademie
der Wissenschaften, München, 1982-1995), 6 vols. 
4. I. BIFFI, Figure medievali della teologia (Jaca Book, Milano, 1992) 261-334.
5. D. CANNONE (ed.), Le ‘Notule Libri Posteriorum’ di Robert Kilwardby nella tradizione
esegetica latina medievale del XIII secolo, Vol. 2 (unpublished doctoral thesis, Cas-
sino/Rome, 2003-2004).
6. D. CANNONE, Le ‘Notule Libri Posteriorum’ di Robert Kilwardby: il commento ad
‘Analitici posteriori’ I, 4, 73a34-b24 (per se), “Documenti e studi sulla tradizione
filosofica medievale” 13 (2002) 71-135.
A
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count, as this is developed in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Poste-
rior Analytics and in his De ortu scientiarum. Both of Kilwardby’s texts
are related to his philosophical period, i.e. the time before his entry
into the Dominican Order, even though they are situated at some
distance in time from each other: It seems that Kilwardby’s Com-
mentary on the Posterior Analytics should be dated around 1240,
when he started to teach at the Arts Faculty in Paris: Kilwardby,
therefore, together with Robert Grosseteste, being among the first
to comment upon this book. The De ortu scientiarum, on the other
hand, which is an encyclopedic division of philosophy in the tradi-
tion of Gundissalinus’ De divisone philosophiae7, is usually dated right
at the end of Kilwardby’s teaching career in Paris, that is to say, ap-
proximately 1250, when he joined the Dominican Order, or shortly
afterwards.
2. THE TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE COMMENTARY ON THE
POSTERIOR ANALYTICS
Let us begin with Kilwardby’s Commentary on the Posterior Analyt-
ics or his Notulae, as they are called. This work draws heavily upon
Robert Grosseteste and his Commentary on Aristotle’s text as a
source8. 
As far as the epistemological problem of causal necessity and
contingency is concerned, Kilwardby’s first engagement with this
theme can be found in a passage where, on the occasion of Aristo-
tle’s definition of epistasthai in Analytica posteriora I, 2, Kilwardby dis-
tinguishes different kinds of knowing or, as he puts it, of “scire”. The
passage, which we are going to quote, clearly echoes Grosseteste’s
Commentary and his wording9:
7. R. KILWARDBY, De ortu scientiarum, ed. A. G. JUDY (Pontificial Institute for Me-
diaeval Studies, Toronto, 1976). For some remarks on this work’s relation to Gun-
dissalinus’ Divisio see A. FIDORA, Domingo Gundisalvo y la teoría de la ciencia
arábigo-aristotélica (Eunsa, Pamplona, 2009) 113-115.
8. However, as D. CANNONE, Le ‘Notule Libri Posteriorum’ di Robert Kilwardby: il com-
mento cit., 76-77, points out, Kilwardby rearranges and enriches considerably the
material he has taken over from Grosseteste.
9. Cfr. the corresponding passage in R. GROSSETESTE, Commentarius in Posteriorum
Analyticorum Libros, ed. P. B. ROSSI (Leo S. Olschki, Firenze, 1981) 99-100.
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“Furthermore, it should be understood that ‘to know’ is said in
four ways: (1) in its broadest sense, it refers to the comprehen-
sion of the truth about something, of any kind whatsoever, and
in this sense can one even know contingent events which are
neither probable nor improbable; (2) in its proper sense, it re-
fers to the comprehension of the truth about something which
occurs with a degree of frequency regarding both modes, and
thus are we able to know contingent events that are prone to a
certain regularity; (3) in a sense more proper still, one speaks of
‘knowing’ in relation to the comprehension of the truth about
something which always behaves in the same way and is im-
mutable, and this type of knowledge encompasses the principles
as well as the conclusions; (4) in the most proper sense, howe-
ver, it refers to the comprehension of the truth about some-
thing which always behaves in the same way, insofar as it is
understood by means of something which is prior to it, and
from which it derives its truth and being, as is the case with the
conclusions in a demonstration”10.
Most evidently, Kilwardby takes up Aristotle’s sensu stricto-definition
of knowledge or science in terms of knowledge of causes and neces-
sity —the last in his enumeration—, while introducing, in advance
of this, three sensu lato-concepts of knowledge. These are:
First, knowledge regarding “contingentia ad utrumlibet”, that is
to say, contingent events, which are neither probable nor improba-
ble, but are wholly indefinite11.
10. D. CANNONE (ed.), Le ‘Notule Libri Posteriorum’ cit., 31-32: “Praeterea sciendum,
quod hoc ipsum ‘scire’ dicitur quadrupliciter: (1) communissimo autem modo di -
citur comprehensio veritatis rei, qualiscumque sit res, et sic etiam sciantur con-
tingentia ad utrumlibet; (2) et proprie dicitur comprehensio veritatis rei, quae
frequenter et utroque modo se habet, et sic sciuntur contingentia nata; (3) magis
proprie autem dicitur ‘scire’ comprehensio veritatis rei, quae semper uno modo
se habet et est immutabilis, et iste modus sciendi communis est principiis et con-
clusionibus; (4) maxime proprie dicitur comprehensio veritatis rei, quae semper
uno modo se habet, per acceptionem alterius prioris, a quo habet suam veritatem
et suum esse, et iste modus appropriatur conclusionibus in demonstratione”.
11. For a survey of the different types of contingency featuring in medieval discus-
sions and their respective definitions, see A. MAIER, Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14.
Jahrhundert. Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik (Ed. di Storia e Lette-
ratura, Roma, 1949) 219-250.
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Second, knowledge of “contingentia nata”, that is to say, events
that will or tend to occur with certain regularity, and are therefore
“frequenter”.
And, third, knowledge of what is immutable or necessary, and
is therefore “semper”.
I cannot go into detail here as regards comparing this account
with that of Grosseteste, which latter has been analyzed thoroughly
in an article by Pietro B. Rossi12; suffice it to say, however, that there
are certain differences in terminology, e.g. Kilwardby here prefers to
speak of “contingentia ad utrumlibet” rather than of “contingentia er-
ratica”, as Grosseteste does. But these do not appear to have any doc-
trinal implications13.
It is true that Grosseteste is more explicit in the corresponding
passage from his Commentary about how these kinds of knowledge
should be related to the different sciences. Thus, he mentions that
the second type of knowledge concerns “naturalia”, i.e. is related to
physics, whereas the third type of knowledge is said to be charac-
teristic of mathematics. 
But if we continue to read Kilwardby’s text, it becomes clear
that, in fact, he had the very same correlation or classification as
Grosseteste in mind. Thus, regarding the knowledge of “contingen-
tia nata”, he states that they are susceptible of demonstration, that is
to say, insofar as they occur with a certain regularity, and he goes on
to identify them with the realm of nature and physics:
“The most powerful demonstration is a demonstration of
things which exist always and which are necessary, as has been
shown above; it can be extended, however, to those things
which occur with a degree of frequency, even though they do
not always exist, for which reason we say that contingent events
12. P. B. ROSSI, Robert Grosseteste and the Object of Scientific Knowledge, in J. MCEVOY
(ed.), Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship (Brepols,
Turnhout, 1996) 53-75.
13. In fact, Kilwardby, seemingly without distinction, will also use the term “contin-
gentia erratica” at other points, cfr. infra, for instance, text corresponding to note
21.
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prone to a certain regularity are demonstrable, something
which occurs mainly in the natural sciences”14.
Likewise, with regard to the third kind of knowledge, namely that
which concerns the immutable or the necessary, Kilwardby not only
states that its objects are most suited to demonstration, but he also
establishes a clear relation of this kind of knowledge and one of the
theoretical sciences, namely mathematics, in contrast to physics: “In
the most powerful demonstration, e.g. in mathematics, there are
only necessary principles; in the natural sciences we sometimes find
contingent events that are prone to a certain regularity”15.
Therefore, both physics and mathematics have their place in
Kilwardby’s modal division of knowledge, as we might term it. As far
as the third theoretical science, i.e. metaphysics, is concerned, one
may guess that, for Kilwardby, this discipline is equivalent to his
fourth kind of knowledge, implying, as it does, knowledge of the
cause that confers truth and being —veritas and esse— to the object
under consideration, as well as its necessity.
But what about the first kind of knowledge, the one which deals
with “contingentia ad utrumlibet”? In fact, Kilwardby seems to be
more critical with respect to this form of knowledge, denying that
those “contingentia”, which he proceeds to call “contingentia in-
definita”, can ever become objects of demonstration. Thus, following
Aristotle he writes:
“As Aristotle states in the Prior Analytics, there can be no
demonstration of contingent events, because they do not pos-
sess a means ordered thereto16; however, the things under con-
sideration are infinite, stretching from being to non-being;
hence there is no demonstration thereof; but since artificial and
14. D. CANNONE (ed.), Le ‘Notule Libri Posteriorum’ cit., 294: “Demonstratio potissima
semper est eorum, quae semper sunt et necessaria, sicut supra ostensum est; exten-
dendo tamen est eorum, quae frequenter et non semper sunt, prout nos dicimus,
quod contingentia nata esse demonstrabilia, quod accidit maxime in naturalibus”.
15. Ibidem, 304: “In demonstratione potissima, ut in mathematicis, principia tantum
necessaria sunt; in naturalibus sunt quandoque contingentia nata”.
16. This refers to Analytica posteriora I, 13, where Aristotle states that there is no
epistêmê and no syllogismos apodeiktikos concerning contingent events.
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moral issues are of this kind, they cannot be susceptible of any
demonstration”17.
As a consequence, ethics as well as the arts, i.e. the mechanical
arts, are expressly excluded from the domain of demonstration, since
this type of knowledge is related neither to causal or necessary nor
to regular phenomena. This deliberate exclusion of ethics and the
mechanical arts from demonstrative science, on the one hand, and
their inclusion within the list of the four types of knowledge at the
beginning of Kilwardby’s Notulae, on the other, gives rise, it is true,
to a certain tension. However, Kilwardby does not appear to be
greatly concerned about this, at least not in his Notulae.
3. OPINION AND SCIENCE IN THE DE ORTU SCIENTARUM
Turning to Kilwardby’s De ortu scientiarum, that is to say, a work
written some ten years later, one can observe that he maintains many
of his earlier positions regarding causality, contingency and their re-
lation to knowledge. But it seems that what ten years earlier had ap-
peared to him to be a half-filled glass, now appears to be half empty.
At first glance, if we take a look at the section on physics in the De
ortu scientiarum, it seems to raise no obvious problems. Kilwardby does
not question the epistemological status of the science of nature here;
though he does go on to do so when he comes to discuss the matter of
ethics, which, as we have seen, is problematic with regard to its episte-
mological status, namely insofar as it can be included within a certain
kind of scientia or scire, while it is excluded from demonstrative science. 
Now, in his chapter on ethics, Kilwardby brings about a rap-
prochement between ethics and physics by saying that:
“And just as we have already shown that the practical disciplines
are not based on necessary things, likewise must it be said that
17. D. CANNONE (ed.), Le ‘Notule Libri Posteriorum’ cit., 416: “Ut dicit Aristoteles in
Prioribus, de contingentibus non fiunt demonstrationes, quia in illis non est me-
dium ordinatum, sed ea, quae sunt a proposito, sunt infinita, de esse scilicet et non
esse; ergo de hiis non demonstratur; quare, cum artificialia et moralia sint
huius<modi>, de ipsis non erit demonstratio”.
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physics does not always conclude from necessary principles ei-
ther, nor even from a partial necessity alone [...] as a result of
which there is a high degree of diversity in terms of opinion
concerning natural philosophy. Often conclusions are based on
probable principles, which in truth are false”18.
Indeed, physics, like ethics, does not always conclude from neces-
sary causal relations, but also from what is contingent. This is to-
tally consonant with Kilwardby’s account in the Notulae. However,
the attentive reader will detect another argument concealed in this
passage, for, when speaking of the “diversitas opinionum circa natu-
ralia”, Kilwardby is, actually, alluding to Ptolemy, who in his Al-
magest had put forward serious doubts as to whether to call physics
(alongside theology) a science at all, adding that there could hardly
ever be agreement about the different opinions philosophers held
about nature. For Ptolemy, physics was guesswork (eikasia), it was
purely conjectural, hence the diversity of opinions19.
Of course, the passage quoted merely alludes to this discussion.
However, Kilwardby does go on to state the matter in more explicit
terms: 
“The contingent events which fall within the scope of the prac-
tical arts are infinite and therefore erratic, since, in most cases,
18. R. KILWARDBY, De ortu scientiarum cit., 136-137: “Et sicut iam ostensum est, quod
practicae non sunt ex necessariis, similiter dicendum, quod physica non semper ex
necessariis concludit, neque ex necessitate alteram partem conclusionis tantum,
[...] quod testatur tanta diversitas opinionum circa naturalia. Multotiens etiam con-
cludit per probabilia, quae in veritate sunt falsa”.
19. Cfr. G. J. TOOMER (ed.), Ptolemy’s ‘Almagest’ (Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, 1998) I, 1, 36: “From all this we concluded: that the first two divisions of the-
oretical philosophy should rather be called guesswork than knowledge, theology
because of its completely invisible and ungraspable nature; physics because of the
unstable and unclear nature of matter; hence there is no hope that philosophers
will ever be agreed about them”. A more detailed discussion of this passage can be
found in Albert the Great’s Physica I, 1, 2: “Ptolemaeus propter ultimam rationem
dicit de naturis non haberi scientiam certam propter sui mutabilitatem. Sed potius
esse opinionem de ipsis, cuius signum esse dicit, quia plurimi in naturis diversa
opinati sunt”. Alberti Magni Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Physica. Edidit Paulus
Hossfeld (Aschendorff, Münster, 1987) 4. However, in what follows, Albert clearly
rejects Ptolemy’s view.
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they derive from human intentions and deliberation. Yet so-
metimes it is a matter of contingent events that are prone to a
certain regularity, as occurs in the conjectural arts, such as me-
dicine and navigation, as we have previously stated. Ethics, the-
refore, and the mechanical arts do not provide any certain
knowledge about the things which are their concern, nor does
physics always do so20, although in most cases it does, but they
provide rather opinion and conjectural knowledge”21.
Taking once again as his starting point the precarious epistemologi -
cal status of ethics (and the mechanical arts), Kilwardby is led to a
problematization of the epistemological status of physics as well.
Thus, not only do ethics and the mechanical arts not belong to true
science, certa scientia, but also physics is said to belong, at least partly,
to the domain of opinion and conjecture, as do they.
It is clear that, with regard to the Notulae, Kilwardby has ar-
rived here at a turning point, for while in his rather optimistic half-
filled-glass account of the Notulae ethics and physics were, in a broad
sense, parts of knowledge, now, in his more critical half-empty-glass
account, both are related to the epistemic concept of opinion rather
than science.
It goes without saying that a half-filled glass is the same as a
half-empty one, but what is the case with science and opinion? In
other words, are ethics and, more importantly, physics, when con-
ceived as a certain form of opinion, the same as when they are con-
ceived as a certain form of scientific knowledge?
Apparently Kilwardby himself did not feel all that comfortable
with this rapprochement of ethics and physics, for it clearly weakens
20. Two out of the twenty manuscripts used by A. G. JUDY for his edition omit “phy -
sica”. One may guess that the scribes did not feel at ease with the relegation of
physics to the domain of opinion and conjecture, and therefore decided to elide the
reference to physics.
21. R. KILWARDBY, De ortu scientiarum cit., 137: “Contingentia autem, quae cadunt in
consideratione artium practicarum, sunt infinita et ideo erratica, eo quod ab hu-
mano proposito et consilio proveniunt—dico ut multum. Aliquando tamen [con-
tingentia] sunt nata sicut accidit in coniecturalibus artibus, ut in medicina et
navigatione, ut praedictum est. Et ideo ethica et mechanica non faciunt certam
scientiam eorum, quae ostendunt, sed nec physica in omnibus, licet in multis, sed
magis faciunt opinionem et coniecturalem cognitionem”.
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the epistemological status of physics. Therefore, he hastens to indi-
cate some important differences between ethics and physics. 
In the first place, he reminds us that the contingency of the ob-
jects of physics differs from that of ethics in the following manner:
“It should be known, however, that while physics very often
deals with contingent events, as do the practical arts, they both
do so in different ways. The contingent events which fall within
the scope of physics are contingents prone to a certain regula-
rity, and which frequently behave in a similar manner”22.
To a great extent, this is in line with his explanations from the No-
tulae, where the regularity of the objects of physics was said to guar-
antee their demonstrability.
More interesting than this, however, is a second thread of ar-
gument which he develops immediately after this, and which distin-
guishes the different types of contingency in ethics and physics not
according to their probability, i.e. whether they show a certain regu -
larity or not, but according to their universality, which is defined in
terms of their distance from the sensible world:
“Furthermore, the contingent events considered by physics are
more remote from the senses and more universal than those
which are considered by the practical arts. The reason for this
is that while the former persists in pure speculation, the latter
reaches down into the realm of operations which are in single
sensible things or are concerned with them. Physics, therefore,
is more akin to the definition of philosophy and of true science
than that part of philosophy which is called practical”23.
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22. Ibidem: “Verumtamen sciendum, quod cum physica plerumque sit de contingenti-
bus et practicae de contingentibus, dissimiliter tamen. Contingentia enim, quae
cadunt in consideratione physica, sunt contin gentia nata, quae ut frequentius se
habent uno modo”.
23. Ibidem: “Item contingentia, de quibus considerat physica, sunt magis remota a sensu
et magis universalia quam illa, quae considerant practicae, et causa est, quia illa
stat in sola speculatione, et istae descendunt ad operationes, quae sunt in sensi-
bilibus singularibus et circa illa. Et ita plus habet physica de ratione philosophiae
et verae scientiae quam pars philosophiae, quae dicitur practica”.
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It seems that this second account of the distinction between differ-
ent types of “contingentia” is meant to be a complementary one,
which would explain why the “contingentia” involved in human ac-
tion are “ad utrumlibet”, whereas those which feature in nature are
“frequenter”. If this is true, Kilwardby’s basic account of contingency
does not rely primarily on different probabilities, but rather on the
relation of the phenomena under consideration to the sensible
world and, ultimately, to matter. While the object considered by
physics is distant from matter and more universal, and thus capable
of demonstration, the object considered by ethics has an involve-
ment with material conditions insofar as it is related to actions being
put into practice. This is also, in my eyes, the key to understanding
how opinion and science can eventually be brought together by Kil-
wardby, that is to say, how his half-empty-glass account can be har-
monized with the half-filled one. To this end, a passage from the
Notulae commenting upon Aristotle’s concept of opinion or doxa as
expounded in Analytica posteriora I, 33, is most revealing. For here
Kilwardby explains how opinion and science are related to each
other by way of the object’s relation to matter. In this passage, Kil-
wardby distinguishes two types of opinion. The first has no con-
nection with science at all:
“One mode of opinion—and this is how the word ‘opinion’ is
mainly used—concerns the uncertain behavior of things capa-
ble of behaving otherwise. And in this sense it is clear that opi-
nion and science cannot be the same nor pertain to the same
thing”24.
The second type of opinion, however, is in a certain way identical
with science:
“Another mode of opinion concerns our understanding of
things which are actually necessary, even though they are not
ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO, VOL. 44/1 (2011), 95-109
CAUSALITY, CONTINGENCY AND SCIENCE IN ROBERT KILWARDBY
105
24. D. CANNONE (ed.), Le ‘Notule Libri Posteriorum’ cit., 316: “Uno modo est opinio,
secundum quod maxime usitatum est nomen opinionis, rerum quae possunt aliter
se habere habitus incertus; et hoc modo manifestum est, quod non sunt idem
opinio et scientia, nec etiam eiusdem”.
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considered as being necessary, as may become clear from the
following: There are things which are entirely separate from
material conditions and mutable qualities, and our understan-
ding them as such amounts to scientific knowledge or to a state
of mind possessing certainty. Yet when someone understands
such things by means of sensory images and combines them
with mutable qualities, by which they are not actually accom-
panied, then this person opines, and his understanding is me-
rely opinion, and he does not understand as necessary that
which is indeed necessary, and therefore his understanding is
false. [...] This, however, is the substantial difference between
opinion and science; and from this it becomes clear that with
regard to the very same terms and assertions both can be the
case, since the diversity of the subject matter, namely of the ne-
cessary or contingent terms and assertions, does not introduce
a diversity among that which constitutes the object of science
and that which constitutes the object of opinion”25.
This passage clearly establishes a qualified identity between opinion
and science, insofar as they are both directed at the very same object,
namely those things or states of affairs which are free from matter
and changeable conditions and are thus necessary. Yet, while scien-
tific knowledge has access to these things as such, opinion can attain
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25. Ibidem: “Alio modo est opinio acceptio eorum, quae in veritate sunt necessaria, non
tamen ut necessaria, quod patet sic: sunt res, quae penitus sunt absolute a condi-
tionibus materialibus et dispositionibus transmutabilibus, quarum acceptio et ut
talium scientia est vel certior habitus; sed si aliquis accipiat illas res sub fantas-
matibus et concernat ipsas cum dispositionibus transmutabilibus, cum quibus non
sunt in sua veritate, iste opinans est, et ista acceptio est opinio, et accipitur non ut
necessarium, quod in veritate est necessarium, et ideo mendax est accipiens. [...]
Haec igitur est substantialis differentia scientiae et opinionis; et ex hoc patet, quod
circa eosdem terminos et circa idem enuntiabile potest esse utraque, quia diversi-
tas materiae, sicut terminorum vel enuntiabilium necessariorum vel contingen-
tium, non diversificat scibile et opinabile”. Again, Kilwardby draws on Robert
Grosseteste’s Commentary; this time, however, his account differs quite signifi-
cantly from that of his predecessor. For he reduces Grosseteste’s threefold dis-
tinction to a binary one, eliding Grosseteste’s third definition of opinion as
knowledge of contingent objects as such. Cfr. R. GROSSETESTE, Commentarius in
Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros cit., 278-281.
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them only in combination with their material and changeable con-
ditions. As a result, the propositions of the former will be necessary,
whereas those of the latter are contingent; but this does not mean
that there is any difference between the objects upon which they de-
pend for their truth, for these are the same.
If one takes this account of opinion and science, it seems that,
strictly speaking, contingency is a problem of the knowing subject
rather than of the knowable object, for, from a God’s-eye view,
namely from the perspective of one who perceives the causal rela-
tions as they are, in the absence of any material or mutable condi-
tions, there will not be any contingency at all. One might mention,
in passing, that this is quite in line with Article 93 of the 1277 Paris
Condemnations according to which it is not the case “that with res-
pect to the first cause anything can come about by chance, and that
it is false that everything is preordained by the first cause, since this
would imply that it occurred by necessity”26.
But Kilwardby does not go into this question; instead, he con-
tinues his argument, and derives from the qualified identity of opin-
ion and science a form of equivalence between dialectic (or topical)
propositions based on probable assumptions and demonstrative
propositions founded on necessary causal relations:
“From this it follows that, if being probable and resting on opi-
nion are the same thing, then being probable and being open to
demonstration are not substantially different in terms of the di-
versity of their subject matter, and hence a dialectical proposi-
tion and a demonstrative one are identical in substance, and
this is necessary”27.
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26. Cfr. R. HISSETTE (ed.), Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277
(Publications Universitaires, Louvain, 1977) 160: “quod aliqua possunt casualiter
evenire respectu causae primae; et quod falsum est, omnia esse praeordinata a causa
prima, quia tunc evenirent de necessitate”.
27. D. CANNONE (ed.), Le ‘Notule Libri Posteriorum’ cit., 316: “Et ex hoc sequitur, quod
si idem est opinabile et probabile, tunc probabile et demonstrativum non diffe-
runt substantialiter per diversitatem materiae, et tunc eadem in substantia est pro-
positio dialectica et demonstrativa, et hoc est necessarium”.
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In short, this is how the half-filled glass account coincides with the
half-empty one: ethics and, in particular, physics, when conceived as
opinion-based or dialectical forms of knowledge, are scientific
knowledge insofar as opinion and science both depend on the very
same object, which gradually proceeds from being the object of
opinion and dialectical propositions to being the object of demon-
strative science according to its relation to the sensible world and
matter. 
Against this background, it is possible to understand how, in
keeping with his Notulae, Kilwardby can conclude at the end of his
discussion of the epistemological status of ethics and physics in the
De ortu scientiarum, that both are, in fact, in a certain manner, parts
of the hierarchy of philosophy and of true science:
“True and certain science is found first and foremost in meta-
physics and mathematics: in metaphysics principally because of
the dignity of its subject matter, in mathematics principally be-
cause of the certainty of its mode of demonstration; only sec-
ondly and to a lesser degree in physics; thirdly and to an even
lesser degree in ethics; and lastly and to the least degree in the
mechanical arts, as is clear from what has been said”28 .
4. CONCLUSION
The preceding remarks can be summed up in the following way:
First, in his Notulae, even though Kilwardby lays down the
foundations for his later discussion of the epistemological problem
of causal necessity and contingency, he does not seem to be aware of
or, at least, is not concerned about possible problems arising from his
account.
Second, in the De ortu scientiarum, however, which takes as its
starting point the precarious epistemological status of ethics and
ALEXANDER FIDORA
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28. R. KILWARDBY, De ortu scientiarum cit., 137: “Prius enim et magis invenitur vera et
certa scientia in metaphysica et mathematica, magis tamen in metaphysica pro dig-
nitate subiecti, magis autem in mathematica pro certo modo demonstrandi; deinde
minus et posterius in physica; tertio adhuc minus et posterius in ethica; ultimo
autem et minime in mechanica, sicut patet ex dictis”.
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Ptolemy’s rather critical account of physics, Kilwardby tackles a cen-
tral issue deriving from the opposition of necessary causal knowl-
edge on the one hand and contingent knowledge on the other,
namely the tension between science and opinion.
Third, Kilwardby’s solution is based upon a novel account of
contingency, which seems to operate in a more fundamental manner
than the one which assesses different probabilities of contingent
events. This novel account is embodied by his explanation of con-
tingency in terms of matter-relatedness and the latter’s negative con-
sequences for our apprehension of the existing causal relations.
Fourth, this account allows him to place and to discuss the
problem of contingency in a genuinely epistemological context, re-
lating it to opinion and science, and showing that the problem of
contingency is a problem of the knowing subject, rather than a meta-
physical issue, since from a God’s-eye view it would be possible to
identify the determinant causal structures of reality.
Finally, Kilwardby’s treatment of the epistemological problem
of causal necessity and contingency finds its solution in an “analogia
philosophiae”29, as he calls it, which is capable of reconciling strictly
scientific knowledge with opinion-based or, rather, conjectural forms
of knowledge, insofar as he states a qualified identity between opin-
ion and science with regard to their object.
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29. Ibidem.
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